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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
WESLEY ALLEN TUTTLE, 
Defendant-Apellant. 
Case No. 20068 
Category No. 2 
REPLY TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's petition should be denied because this 
Court's opinion supports a conclusion that the admission of the 
hypnotically enhanced testimony and exclusion of expert testimony 
on the reliability of that evidence was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. As the Court stated, the evidence against 
defendant was strong. The evidence defendant presents in his 
rehearing petition is minimal and the jury was not obligated to 
accept it. 
The Court did err in excluding expert testimony on the 
reliability of the hypnotically enhanced testimony, however, the 
case law presented by defendant does not support the conclusion 
he urges, i.e. that violation of the federal right to due process 
can never be harmless. Moreover, this Court did not find that 
there was a violation of federal constitutional rights but 
avoided the question by finding its exclusion harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Defendant overlooks this critical point and 
leaps to the conclusion that there was constitutional error that 
cannot be harmless. Because there is no finding of 
constitutional error, and because the error was harmless in any 
event, this Court need not grant rehearing. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT DID NOT OVERLOOK OR MISAPPREHEND 
ANY FACTS THAT SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S CONTENTION 
THAT HE WAS PREJUDICED BY THE INTRODUCTION OF 
HYPNOTICALLY ENHANCED TESTIMONY. 
Defendant complains that this Court overlooked facts 
that he believes should have created doubt in the juror's minds 
and that, therefore, this Court should have found that the 
erroneous introduction of hypnotically enhanced testimony was not 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As this Court noted, it did 
not rule on whether the error violated defendant's federal 
constitutional rights because it found the error to be harmless. 
While the State asserts that there was no federal constitutional 
error, analysis of this issue is not necessary because this Court 
correctly evaluated the evidence adduced at trial and concluded 
that introduction of the hypnotically enhanced evidence was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Without acknowledging the weighty evidence produced by 
the State of his guilt, defendant asserts that evidence he 
presented should be used by this Court to undermine the jury's 
verdict. Defendant fails to cite to the record for any of the 
evidence he refers to and does not even identify what witnesses 
Defendant also cites to the Utah Constitution but does not 
engage in any separate analysis, therefore, the State will assume 
that he asserts that the analysis parallels that of the federal 
constitution. 
testified to the evidence he claims creates doubt of his guilt. 
Normally, this Court will assume correctness of the judgment 
where a defendant fails to refer to pages in the record to 
support his points on appeal. State v. Olmos, 712 P.2d 287 (Utah 
1986). Further, this Court has stated that failure to cite to 
the record is an independent grounds for affirmance, State v. 
Sutton, 707 P.2d 681 (Utah 1985), and this Court has declined to 
rule on arguments that require the Court to supply analysis not 
provided by the defendant, State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 
1984). These general rules are even more applicable in this case 
because defendant's failure to supply the Court with record 
citations comes at a time when this Court has already carefully 
reviewed the entire record. Where a defendant urges that the 
Court erred in its review by overlooking or misapprehending 
facts, this Court should not be required to comb the record 
looking for the alleged errors. 
The Court's opinion adequately addresses the evidence 
adduced by the State. However, a brief review of some of the 
most damaging evidence may be helpful. Several witnesses other 
than Matt Fish identified defendant's truck as the one they saw 
at the scene or towing Ms. Merrick's car (See testimony of: Dell 
Babcock at T. 965-69; David Albrycht at T. 981-83, 987; Francis 
Albrycht at T. 997-99, 1001-02; Kent Moffat at T. 1024, 1026-27, 
1031-33). Kent Moffat, who identified defendant's truck as being 
the one he saw at the scene, also observed what appeared to him 
to be a struggle between a man and a woman and saw the man push 
the woman into the car (T. 1021-22). Moffat's description of the 
man fit defendant's description (compare T. 1024, 1032-33 with T. 
1130, 1141, 1210). 
Hair consistent with defendant's hair was found 
embedded in blood on the rearview mirror of Ms. Merrick's car (T. 
1258, 1278, 1299). While other hair inconsistent with 
defendant's may have been located in the car, that fact does not 
disprove that defendant was the perpetrator nor even make it less 
likely. All that it establishes is that other people were inside 
Ms. Merrick's car at some unknown time, not that any of these 
people were the perpetrator. 
Also damaging to defendant's protestations of innocence 
are that he told inconsistent stories about whether he was at the 
scene of the crime (T. 1186, 1202, 1204, 1369, 1373, 1746), that 
he changed his appearance (T. 1130, 1141, 1210, 1757), and that 
he fled upon being informed that the police were getting close to 
him (T. 1202-03, 1211-12, 1366-71). Also significant is 
defendant's admission that he was present at the scene even 
though he denied involvement (T. 1712-17). 
All of this evidence, taken together, established 
overwhelmingly that defendant killed Sidney Ann Merrick. This 
Court need not, therefore, grant a rehearing to reconsider the 
minimal facts defendant offers as leaving a reasonable doubt of 
his guilt. 
POINT II 
THERE IS NO SUPPORT FOR DEFENDANT'S CLAIM 
THAT A DENIAL OF FEDERAL DUE PROCESS CANNOT 
BE HARMLESS ERROR. 
Defendant assumes that exclusion of expert testimony on 
the reliability of hypnotically enhanced testimony is a violation 
2 
of federal due process. Based upon this assumption, he then 
asserts that such an exclusion can never be harmless error. His 
argument is unsubstantiated and should not be the basis for 
rehearing this case. 
At the outset, it is important to reiterate that this 
Court declined to rule on whether exclusion of the expert 
testimony was a violation of defendant's federal constitutional 
rights. Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that the 
error was of constitutional magnitude, it could still be harmless 
and this Court's ruling should stand. 
Defendant cites Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986), for 
the proposition that some constitutional error cannot be 
harmless. While Clark stated that general proposition, it was by 
no means referring specifically to the exclusion of expert 
testimony on the reliability of hypnotically enhanced testimony. 
Nor has defendant cited any cases directly on point. As Clark 
emphasized, it is the fact-finding process that is implicated in 
a harmless error analysis and if errors do not contribute to the 
See note 1, supra. 
verdict, they are harmless. 478 U.S. at 578, citing Delaware v. 
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986) and Chapman v. California, 
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) . 
Accordingly, if the defendant had counsel and 
was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there 
is a strong presumption that any other errors 
that may have occurred are subject to 
harmless-error analysis. The thrust of the 
many constitutional rules governing the 
conduct of criminal trials is to ensure that 
those trials lead to fair and correct 
judgments. Where a reviewing court can find 
that the record developed at trial 
establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 
the interest in fairness has been satisfied 
and the judgment should be affirmed. 
Clark, 478 U.S. at 579. 
This case is distinguishable from Halloway v. Arkansas, 
435 U.S. 475 (1978), in which the United States Supreme Court 
held that representation by an attorney of co-defendants with a 
conflict of interest could never be harmless. In Halloway, the 
court noted that where an error occurs at trial, the reviewing 
court can readily identify its scope and have confidence in its 
ability to pursue "its relatively narrow task of assessing the 
likelihood that the error materially affected the deliberations 
of jury." 435 U.S. at 490. Because an attorney might refrain 
from doing things on behalf of one client that might 
detrimentally affect the other client, the court felt a harmless 
error analysis was not useful in Halloway since these things 
would not be evident in the record. In this case, this Court was 
able to undertake a harmless error analysis because it was able 
to evaluate whether the testimony that the expert would have 
attacked was critical to the jury verdict. The interest in 
fairness has been satisfied here and this Court should deny 
rehearing. 
The exclusion of this testimony was harmless because 
the jury had before it the ability to test the reliability of Mr. 
Fish's testimony. The jury was presented with a prehypnosis 
statement from Mr. Fish (R. 679, ex. A). From this statement the 
jury was able to determine what were the differences in Mr. 
Fish's memory before and after hypnosis. They were also 
presented with a transcript of Mr. Fish's statements made under 
hypnosis (R. 680-92, T. 1064-65). From this transcription, the 
jury could determine what new details came out during hypnosis. 
While Mr. Fish testified to more details at trial than 
were present in his prehypnosis statement, the jury heard these 
same details from other witnesses. The fact that the word 
"Apache" was written on the truck was also testified to by Dell 
Babcock (T. 968). Defendant's truck was identified by several 
other witnesses (See discussion in Point I, supra). The victim's 
car was identified by other witnesses as the one being towed and 
these witnesses also identified the towing vehicle as defendant's 
truck (David and Francis Albrycht at T. 982, 998, 987, 1001-02, 
and Kent Moffat at T. 1026, 1031-32). Thus, the overwhelming 
evidence of guilt makes it unlikely beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the result of the trial would have been different if the 
expert had testified. State v. Tuttle, No. 20068 slip op. at 15 
(Utah App. 12, 1989). The testimony of Mr. Fish was corroborated 
by other witnesses and was not critical to the State's case since 
defendant admitted his presence at the scene, thus, any testimony 
that miqht have undermined its credibilitv was not critical. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to deny defendant's petition for rehearing. 
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